Hello, χαίρετε, and welcome to Epic Greek History Episode 37, “Meanwhile, Out West: Greece vs. Carthage.” I’m Scott Emmons.
We’ve just come off the Persian invasion under Xerxes and the successful defense of mainland Greece. In this episode, we’re shifting our focus to the west to look at what was happening at the same time in the Greek cities of Sicily. It can be easy to forget that these Greek cities of southern Italy and Sicily were absolutely a part of the Hellenic world. I have to admit that when I was first learning about Greek history, I’d be reading my textbook and when I’d get to a chapter about this area, it felt like a distraction, like a subplot that took away from the main action. But the more you learn about Magna Graecia, “Great Greece” as it was called, the clearer it becomes that it played a vital role in Greek culture.
That said, there are some peculiarities about the Greek cities in this area. When the Greeks started founding settlements there back in the 8th century BCE, they had to contend with various populations that were already established on the island. There were Sicans, who seem to have considered themselves autochthonous, in other words they’d always been there. The Sicels had a very similar name, but they were evidently a different ethnic group, and Greek writers were careful to distinguish them from Sicans. There was a group called the Elymians, who had ancient authors arguing and scratching their heads over where they came from. And then there was the Phoenician settlement of Carthage on the North African coast. As it grew in wealth and military power, it wanted its own pieces of the Sicilian pie. So the Carthaginians established important settlements in Sicily along with all those others.
So what we end up with is a very complicated web of different ethnic and cultural groups competing for power, and of course alliances that shift over time. That political landscape may help explain why in the early fifth century BCE, the major Greek cities of Sicily were still ruled by tyrants. Strong central leadership would have been a great advantage for both defense and diplomacy when dealing with so many potential challenges. And with all these states jockeying for position, there was no shortage of mercenaries to help those tyrants stay in power.
So that was the general situation in Sicily when Xerxes was preparing to invade mainland Greece. In that same year, 480 BCE, Carthage undertook a major invasion of Sicily. The commander was a man named Hamilcar, who’s sometimes called a “king” in the Greek and Roman sources, but that’s misleading. He was a suffete, one of two top elected officials in Carthage, something like a consul in the Roman republic. He came from one of the most illustrious Carthaginian families. But just to hammer home what I said about the crazy web of connections, he wasn’t 100% Carthaginian. His mother was a Sicilian Greek. And he had ties with various Sicilian communities, Greek and otherwise. But the main objective for Carthage, of course, was to expand its power and influence. So, while the mainland Greeks were busy fighting off Xerxes, Hamilcar led a huge force to Sicily.
The timing leads to a very interesting question. Were these invasions coordinated? If so, to what extent? Herodotus only devotes a couple of paragraphs to this war, and he doesn’t mention any kind of bargain that Xerxes made with Carthage. But we have a much fuller account from the later historian Diodorus Siculus — in other words, Diodorus of Sicily — who naturally had a special interest in his home country. Diodorus says explicitly that Xerxes made a pact with Carthage. In the Loeb Classical Library translation by C.H. Oldfather, quote:
And Xerxes… desiring to drive all the Greeks from their homes, sent an embassy to the Carthaginians to urge them to join him in the undertaking and closed an agreement with them, to the effect that he would wage war upon the Greeks who lived in Greece, while the Carthaginians should at the same time gather great armaments and subdue those Greeks who lived in Sicily and Italy. Unquote
Diodorus or his source may just be assuming there was a formal arrangement based on the timing. But it does seem likely that there was at least some communication, whether direct or indirect, between the Persians and the Carthaginians. After all, Phoenicia was a part of the Persian Empire, and Carthage was a Phoenician settlement. I think at the very least, the Carthaginians would have been aware of what was going on in Greece and would have understood that it was a perfect opportunity to expand their power in Sicily.
The Sicilian Greeks knew a confrontation was brewing. In an earlier episode we saw how envoys from the allied Greek cities approached the tyrant Gelon of Syracuse to request help against Xerxes. Gelon answered that he would send troops and ships, but only if he were given command of the entire Greek defense. He knew that neither the Spartans nor the Athenians would agree to that. It was probably his face-saving way of turning down the request, since he knew that pretty soon he might need his forces at home to face a Carthaginian assault.
So now we come to what screenwriters call the “inciting incident” — the event that sets the whole plot in motion. This gets a bit tricky to follow, but I’ll try to lay out the basics as clearly as possible. There were three Greek cities that played major roles. You can visualize Sicily roughly as an inverted triangle with a horizontal line at the top and two legs coming down and meeting in an angle at the bottom. On the Eastern side toward the bottom was Syracuse, the biggest and most powerful of the Greek cities. Its ruler was the tyrant Gelon, the one I just mentioned. On the western lower leg of the triangle was Acragas, another important city, ruled by the tyrant Theron. Gelon of Syracuse and Theron of Acragas were close allies. So much so that their combined forces were strong enough to cause concern among the Carthaginians and really anyone trying to navigate the power politics in Sicily. The third city, up on the northern coast, was Himera, and its tyrant was a man named Terillus.
Well, the trouble started when Theron of Acragas took his army up to the north coast, drove Terillus out, and seized power at Himera. Terillus had a powerful Greek ally, the tyrant Anaxilas of Rhegion, which was on the Italian mainland just across the strait from Sicily. But even together, they were nowhere near a match for the combined forces of Gelon and Theron. So Terillus had to look somewhere else for support. Fortunately for him, he had a strong guest-friend relationship with Hamilcar of Carthage. He invited Carthage to invade, hoping to get back into power in Himera, even if it meant he’d be a client king. In that way, he was something like the Pisistratids of Athens, who were forever cozying up to the Persian king in hopes of restoring their tyranny at home. So Terillus made that appeal, and to sweeten the deal, his ally Anaxilas offered his own children to Carthage as hostages to guarantee his loyalty to the cause.
This was Hamilcar’s big chance to tip the balance of power in Sicily toward Carthage. He answered Terillus’ request by bringing a huge military force to Sicily. Both Herodotus and Diodorus say he had 300,000 combatants, which is probably an inflated number. But we hear that he had 200 warships plus a much greater number of transport vessels. As usual, I don’t want to split hairs about exact numbers. It was a gigantic force, made up mostly of mercenaries from different parts of north Africa and Spain.
But unlike Xerxes, Hamilcar couldn’t march an army into Sicily. He had to take that whole force over by sea. And in a scenario that’s become familiar from recent episodes, he ran into bad weather during the crossing and lost a lot of his ships. The heavy transports carrying chariots and horses were especially hard hit. But despite the losses, he still landed a very large force at Panormus — now known as Palermo — on the north coast of Sicily. That was friendly territory, because Panormus was a Carthaginian settlement. Once he got there, he’s supposed to have said, “The war is as good as won, because we’ve already faced our most dangerous enemy.” Namely, the sea. Diodorus doesn’t tell us the context for that remark, but it sounds to me like something he might have said in a speech to his troops to boost their morale.
Well, Panormus was only about 50 kilometers, or 31 miles, west of Himera. Hamilcar spent a few days there to repair his ships and rest his troops, then marched his army to Himera, with the fleet following along the coast. He set up his main army camp to the west of the city while most of his ships were hauled up on the beach and protected by a ditch with a palisade. Theron of Acragas, the guy who’d driven Terillus out, was holding Himera with a large force of his own. But when his troops sallied out to fight the invaders, they were badly beaten. Theron sent an urgent message to his old friend Gelon of Syracuse, saying he needed help right away. Gelon already had his forces on alert, so he lost no time in coming to Theron’s aid. Hamilcar controlled the western approaches to Himera, but Gelon established a strong position to the east.
When Gelon assessed the situation, he could see that it would be too risky to fight a pitched battle against the Carthaginians. So at first he opted for guerilla tactics. At this point, Carthaginian soldiers were scattered over the countryside, looting and pillaging. Gelon sent his cavalry out to attack those disordered troops. The raids were probably all the more successful because Hamilcar had lost so many horses at sea. According to Diodorus, Gelon’s forces took ten thousand prisoners that way.
Well, one man who was caught up in these operations was a courier from the city of Selinus on his way to the Carthaginian camp with a letter for Hamilcar. Selinus was a Greek city, but it was allied with Carthage. And the letter contained a message that Selinus would send a cavalry force on an appointed day, when Hamilcar was planning a magnificent sacrifice to Poseidon. When that letter fell into Gelon’s hands, it became the key to the Greek victory. He reckoned that the Carthaginians and their mercenaries wouldn’t know one Greek cavalry unit from another. So, on the appointed day, he had a division of his own cavalry show up at the Carthaginian naval camp, posing as the force from Selinus. And the guards waved them on through.
As soon as they were in, with the element of surprise on their side, they set off after Hamilcar. They would have had no trouble finding him, because at that moment he was presiding over his spectacular sacrifice to Poseidon, burning victims whole on a great fire altar. The Syracusan horsemen rushed in and killed him on the spot, then fanned out and set fire to the ships. Strangely, after the battle, Hamilcar’s body was never accounted for. One theory is that the Greek attackers threw his corpse into the fire to let him burn along with all the sacrificial victims. That may have given rise to the Carthaginian version of the story, which Herodotus reports. According to them, he saw that his army was facing disaster and threw himself into the flames, preferring to die rather face defeat.
Meanwhile, Gelon had posted scouts at lookout points with orders to give him a signal as soon as the cavalry was in. When he got the signal, he led his full army against the Carthaginian naval camp. What followed was a long, bloody battle that went back and forth for some time. But as word of Hamilcar’s death spread through the Carthaginian forces, their morale started to crumble. The Syracusans finally gained the advantage, and the Carthaginian lines broke and ran. The result was an absolute bloodbath. Some of the retreating forces escaped to a strong position in the hills for a time, but there was no good water source, so they couldn’t hold out for long. Some escaped to the few ships that were on patrol duty and hadn’t been hauled up on the beach. But on their way home, they ran into another storm, and only a few survivors made it back to Carthage to deliver the news. The battle of Himera had brought Hamilcar’s Sicilian expedition to an abrupt end.
So, while the Greek cities of the mainland were fighting off Xerxes in the east, the Sicilian Greeks defeated Hamilcar in the west. Those dual victories appealed to the Greek sense of symmetry, so it was only natural for the legend to arise that the great battles were simultaneous. Curiously, the Greek historians aren’t consistent in the way they depict that symmetry. Herodotus tell us that the battle of Himera occurred on the same day as the victory at Salamis. Diodorus says it was on the day of Thermopylae.
The aftereffects of this war amount to a great increase in wealth for both Syracuse and Acragas. Carthage agreed to pay a sizeable war indemnity. In addition, the Greek forces had captured a great deal of booty, and even more important, tremendous numbers of captives who would be put to work as slaves. That free labor contributed greatly to public works in those cities. At Acragas, gangs of slaves were used to quarry the stone for new temples. And to this day, their work contributes to the Sicilian tourism industry. The Valley of the Temples at Agrigento — ancient Acragas — has one of the densest concentrations of classical Greek temples in the world. Not all of those were built by slaves taken in this war. But an early one, the temple of Olympian Zeus, is thought to be a monument to that battle. And it certainly kicked off a building boom that continued for decades. I’ve never seen the Valley of the Temples myself, but it’s on my bucket list.
And that concludes Episode 37. I learned a lot from putting this episode together, and I hope you have too. As always, if you have comments, questions, corrections, anything at all to add, I’ll be very happy to hear from you at scott@epicgreekhistory.com. Or you can always leave a comment on my Facebook or Instagram. I’m Scott Emmons. The music for this episode was composed and recorded by Matt Hobbs and Parry Gripp. My logo and other artwork are by Chris Harding. Until next time, εὐτυχεῖτε! Be well.